By Dr. Kamal Alhallak, PhD | Part 8 of 10
On December 19, 2025, the Alberta Court of Appeal made a significant ruling about the relationship between pharmacy practice and cosmetic services. It concluded that the Botox, PDO-thread and platelet-rich plasma activities at issue in my case fell within pharmacy practice and were professional services subject to regulation. For anyone trying to understand my journey, that is an essential starting point. [1]
The ruling deserves an accurate explanation. The Court rejected a narrow interpretation of professional scope, and the College succeeded on its cross-appeal concerning that interpretation. At the same time, the Court identified material problems requiring reconsideration of the allegations about how I had provided those services. Those conclusions belong together. [1] [2]
Why the definition of pharmacy practice mattered
The dispute involved more than whether people commonly associate cosmetic treatment with pharmacists. It concerned the language of the Health Professions Act and the duties that attach when a pharmacist provides a professional service. Schedule 19 describes pharmacists’ role in promoting health and preventing and treating disease, dysfunction and disorders, then lists activities performed in that role. [1]
The College’s earlier Appeal Panel had treated cosmetic purpose as a reason to exclude otherwise listed activities from pharmacy practice. On that approach, prescribing Botox for a therapeutic purpose could be a professional service while providing it for appearance-related reasons could fall outside that category. This interpretation had led the Panel to overturn several findings against me. [1]
That approach created a fundamental question: should the legal character of an activity depend on assumptions about why a patient wants it? The Court examined the actual statutory language and the wider purpose of professional regulation. Its answer changed the foundation on which the remaining allegations had to be considered. [1]
The Court rejected a categorical exclusion of cosmetic care
The Court found that the earlier analysis had given insufficient attention to the words “promote health.” It explained that the legislation recognizes a broader understanding of health than the prevention and treatment of disease alone. It also noted that an appearance-related purpose does not automatically remove procedures performed by other regulated health professionals from the Act’s scope. [1]
The judgment then addressed the structure of Schedule 19. When a pharmacist performs an activity falling within the listed statutory activities, its cosmetic function does not, by itself, take it outside pharmacy practice. The Court’s analysis focused on the activity performed and its place in the legislation. [1]
I regard that as an important clarification for our profession. A discussion about the boundaries of practice should begin with the law, the actual procedure and the relevant professional obligations. A broad label such as “cosmetic” cannot do all of that analytical work.
How the Court applied that reasoning to my services
The Court applied its interpretation to three categories of activity. It addressed Botox as a Schedule 1 drug, PDO threads as devices, and the preparation and administration of platelet-rich plasma within the statutory activities described in Schedule 19. It concluded that all three treatments at issue were within pharmacy practice and subject to regulation as professional services. [1]
The judgment also rejected the suggestion advanced on my behalf that cosmetic use changed Botox’s status as a Schedule 1 drug. I include that point because an honest account of a court decision must explain conclusions that did not favour my position. The Court’s reasoning governs how I describe the case. [1]
Equally, being within the profession’s scope does not establish that every instance of treatment complied with every applicable obligation. The Court expressly explained that an activity remains professional practice even if the manner in which it is performed is alleged to be improper. Classification and compliance are separate questions. [1]
Why the College’s successful cross-appeal did not resolve every allegation
The College’s success on the scope question meant that professional standards applied to the services. It did not automatically establish all the misconduct findings the original Hearing Tribunal had made. The Court said that reviewing the Tribunal’s decision revealed material issues of fact and law. It therefore sent the specified allegations back for further consideration. [2]
One example concerned the evidentiary basis for identifying which PDO threads had actually been used on patients. Another concerned the reasoning applied to platelet-rich plasma. The Court discussed these weaknesses without finally deciding every underlying allegation in my favour. The resulting order was a remittal for reconsideration. [2]
For me, the significance is straightforward: a regulator must establish both the applicable obligation and the evidence supporting an alleged breach. Establishing regulatory jurisdiction is one part of that process. It cannot substitute for careful examination of the allegation itself.
What this judgment means for professional responsibility
I have consistently wanted a serious discussion about training, competence and appropriate regulation of cosmetic practice. The Court’s decision provides an important basis for that discussion because it places the activities considered in my case within the professional framework. It also makes clear why professional obligations continue to matter. [1]
I do not present the judgment as a certificate of competence for every pharmacist or as unrestricted permission to perform every cosmetic procedure. Individual authorization, training, the relevant standards and the circumstances of the service still require attention. The judgment addressed the legal issues before the Court; it did not erase the rest of the regulatory framework. [1] [2]
The newer standards raise a separate legal question
The College adopted newer standards in June 2024 for implementation in February 2025. My challenge to those standards is a separate proceeding. The December 2025 judgment in my disciplinary appeal did not itself strike them down. In its October 2026 brief, the College defended the newer standards and disputed the implications I draw from the earlier judgment. Those are the parties’ positions in that separate case. [3]
My position is that the Court’s interpretation must be taken seriously when the profession discusses its future. I want a framework that explains how competence is demonstrated, how care is documented, when collaboration is required and how patients are protected. That is the constructive discussion I believe this case should help advance.
The value of the judgment is strongest when its actual reasoning is kept intact. It recognized the professional character of the services in question, preserved the College’s regulatory role, and required further scrutiny of the allegations. That is a substantial decision, and it deserves to be described precisely.
Sources and documents
[1] Al-Hallak v Alberta College of Pharmacy, 2025 ABCA 419. Paragraphs 23–62, particularly 33–42, 47, 50–54, 57 and 61–62. Read the Court of Appeal judgment.
[2] Court of Appeal judgment: reconsideration of professional-services allegations. Paragraphs 63–70 and 147–149. Read the Court of Appeal judgment.
[3] College’s respondent’s brief in the separate standards challenge, filed October 8, 2026. Paragraphs 68–69 and 113–118; PDF pages 21 and 33–34.
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